

A Brief Experimental Philosophy Bibliography
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Overviews

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Criticisms

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Other Resources

1. The Experimental Philosophy Blog
<http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/>
2. Interactive version of the Trolley Problem
<http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/fatman/Default.aspx>
3. Other problems (under development)
<http://www.philosophyexperiments.com/fatman/Default.aspx>