It is always an honor to address a gathering of philosophy teachers. It is a special honor to address this gathering of philosophy teachers—the American Association of Philosophy Teachers—because this is an organization whose sole purpose is improving the teaching of philosophy. We come together every other year and, in a mood of unfailing collegiality and congeniality, we demonstrate an almost infinite set of disagreements. As our program always makes clear, we cannot agree about how to teach; we cannot agree about what to teach; we cannot even agree ultimately about what it is that we teach: what philosophy is. We do agree, however, on the importance of philosophy, and on the need to improve the way that it is taught, regardless of subtopic or level or context. We all recognize that we could do a better job of our own teaching; and we know that, when we come to these meetings, we will find others who will help us in our quest to improve.

Given this introduction, I am presumably required to discuss something that I believe will be of value to all of you in your teaching. Constrained by such a lofty criterion, I will necessarily be brief. What I would like to discuss with you today is one of the greatest philosophy lectures ever given in this country, by one of our greatest philosophers, to see what it might contain that could help us all become better philosophy teachers. The philosopher in question is Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), whom Americans seldom see as a philosopher since we usually waste him on high school students. (Fortunately, I attended a high school so dreadful that we never read Emerson. As a result, when I came upon him in graduate school, I was better able to appreciate his philosophic importance).1 The lecture in question is an address called “The American Scholar” that Emerson gave to the Phi Beta Kappa assembly the day after graduation at Harvard College on 31 August 1837.2

There are any number of important themes in Emerson’s “American Scholar,” some of which you may still remember from your high school days. One is his attempt to make sense of America as a place of independent intellectual life, no longer subsidiary to ideas from abroad. “We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe,” he writes (114).3 “Our day of
dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of other lands, draws to a close” (81). The time will shortly arrive when “we will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds” (115). This message of intellectual independence is not without import today. What are the current ‘fashions’ in ideas? Do these ideas resonate well in the life of our culture? Do we have a culture? Is there in fact a we? These questions, however, are questions for another day.

Another central theme in “The American Scholar” is the importance of openness to the simple and the everyday. Far too often, we overlook significant elements of our lives—our problems, our worries, our little victories—because we believe that such elements are not important enough to merit ‘intellectual’ or ‘philosophical’ scrutiny. Emerson recognized that for many people what mattered was not the events of their own lives but what was going on in Europe, or in the big city, or in the fancy house on the hill. In the place of these misdirected valuations, he recommends attention to such local matters as “[t]he literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, [and] the meaning of household life.” Rather than “the great, the remote, [and] the romantic,” Emerson would have us throw off the callouses of living and “embrace the common . . . the familiar, [and] the low” (111). This too is a message of importance today, when our souls are being called away from our lives by the wonders of the distant and the virtual. How are we to value our own lives? How do we help our children (and our students) as they search for lasting values amidst the many attractions of their lives? These too, however, are questions for another day.

The theme from Emerson’s address that is of most direct relevance to us in our role as philosophy teachers is that of the scholar himself. (I hope that you can follow the spirit of Emerson’s message, and overcome the letter of his gendered language.) We are, all of us, teachers; and we do, all of us, aspire to be scholars. We hope, moreover, to draw our students into the life of the scholar as well. By this I do not mean drawing them into lives of amassing arcane facts that would hardly be missed if no one had bothered to amass them (although we all know many facts that would fit this description). Neither do I mean becoming scholars who produce obscure research from which it is unlikely that anyone will benefit (although we all have probably done some of this). By ‘scholar’ I mean individuals who play a special role in the lives of their communities and their society because of their involvement in the life of ideas and knowledge and learning. Emerson defines the term somewhat differently; but I think that his point is the same. “The scholar,” he tells us, “is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future” (90). Most of us, I suspect, know few students who would on their own aspire to the life of the scholar so described. Still, we have no reason to assume that Emerson’s ragtag bunch of ‘scholars’ at that little New England college 161 years ago were any less reluctant to take up this burden than ours are. How can we inspire our students to pursue the life of the ‘scholar’ in this broad sense?

My suspicion is that the only way to draw our students into the life of the scholar is to present it fully. This is what Emerson does. He addresses, first of all, the mistaken assumption that the scholar lives in the past comfortably hidden behind a stack of books. We need our books, of course; but, as Emerson writes, they are at best tools. “The theory of books is noble. The scholar of the first age received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new arrangement of his own mind, and uttered it again. It came into him life; it went out from him truth” (87). Over time, however, we tend to forget that it was the experience that mattered—the wonders, the heroism, the beauty, the loss—and we begin to give primacy to the description of the experience. “The sacredness which attaches to the act of creation, the act of thought, is transferred to the record” (88). As a result, Emerson continues, “[m]eek young men grow up in libraries, believing it their duty to accept the views which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon, have given; forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these books” (89). Instead of helping us move forward, too often books bury us in the past.

The theory of books is noble. “Books are the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst” (89). Abuse leads to “the bookworm” and to “the book-learned class, who value books, as such” (89). Books are well used, on the other hand, as tools in the advancement of the soul. Emerson tells us that “[t]he one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul. This every man is entitled to; this every man contains within him, although in almost all men obstructed and as yet unborn” (90). This active soul—the human spirit that wonders and demands explanations, makes connections and proposes solutions—must come to life before budding scholars can be of any use to themselves or to others. And even the most active of souls have times when the inspirations of nature and experience are weak. Emerson, in fact, suggests that the moments of true inspiration come but seldom:

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"the seer's hour of vision is short and rare among heavy days and months" (93). In any case, when these clouded times come, we turn to others and attempt to grasp their inspiration. "Books," he writes, "are for the scholar's idle times." On the other hand, "[w]hen he can read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men's transcripts of their readings" (91).

Pursuing an education required of us, and requires of our students, a great deal of working with the transcripts of others. Much of what must be learned must be learned "by laborious reading" (93). But how are we to treat these transcripts? As Emerson writes, we should try to focus on "the act of creation" rather than the 'record.' In particular, this requires that we not let ourselves slip, as we teachers easily can, into book-centered teaching, but rather demonstrate our engagement with the world of which the books are pale accounts. The scholar, Emerson reminds us, is actually involved in nature: "Every day, the sun; and, after sunset, Night and her stars. Ever the winds blow; ever the grass grows. Every day, men and women, conversing—being and beholding. The scholar is he of all men whom this spectacle most engages" (84-85). Our engagement with this spectacle is what we need to bring to our students; not our familiarity with the transcripts of others.

In the case of the philosophy teacher, this engagement means introducing our students into the problems and triumphs of human existence, and demonstrating to them that what we are doing together in our classes is helping them to engage further. The course in medical ethics, for example, is not designed to familiarize our students with the 'literature' of ethics or medical ethics, but to enable them to see the complexity of human choices in this professional field and to help them to decide—and to assist others to decide—issues of medical practice in more humane ways. The course in the philosophy of education is not a survey of the educational ideas of the past and present, but a demonstration of the complexity of the ongoing problem of the meaning of human growth. The course in the philosophy of religion is a chance to help our students to engage in an individual way with traditions of meaning that have held sway over the centuries. In these and other courses, we must be ever conscious of our tendency to slip into book-centered teaching, and keep ever primary the actual and potential experiences of our students. Emerson writes that "[o]nly so much do I know, as I have lived" (95); and our goal must be to help our students—not to read about living nor to write about living—but to live.

This focus upon experience is what students have a right to expect in their interactions with us. In our teaching, we can introduce them to problems that they have not anticipated; we can challenge their intuitions and complicate their responses with unexpected facts and unfamiliar interpretations. This is all part of laying out the full range of whatever topic is under examination. Ultimately, however, we need to bring them back to experience. Emerson tells us that "[t]he office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances" (100). If we take this to mean that we should help our students to see what is important amidst everything else, we can recognize how our teaching might go wrong. If we simply bury our students in what they see as 'appearances,' without showing them how to find the 'facts,' we offer them no guidance. Philosophers often have this reality/appearance distinction in mind when we work. We think that we know what is real and what only seems to be. Still, in our special role as philosophy teachers we need to be more conscious of how complex the process of 'showing' our students this difference actually is. However clear some questions have become to us over time, for our students it is always the first time. One method of 'showing' will not work for all, and often repeated attempts will be required until a point comes to life in their minds.

If we manage to bring our students to see the 'facts amidst appearances,' they will come to recognize the nobility of the scholar's life. Emerson describes this nobility as follows: the scholar is "exercising the highest functions of human nature. He is one who raises himself from private considerations and breathes and lives on public and illustrious thoughts" (101). Another way to phrase this would be to say that the message that we as scholars are attempting to transmit to our students begins with the point that their lives matter. Emerson puts it this way: "It is a mischievous notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was finished a long time ago." On the contrary, the world will remain "plastic and fluid" (105) in the hands of our students if they are alive to its possibilities and trust themselves to uncover and understand them. The second part of our message is that our students should become scholars and take up this quest for meaning for themselves. We want all of them to recognize that "[e]ach philosopher, each bard, each actor has only done for me, as by a delegate, what one day I can do for myself" (108), and then carry over this recognition into their lives, and the lives of their families and communities, by leading lives that integrate the richness of ideas with the possibilities of experience.

Early on in "The American Scholar," Emerson makes reference to a fable out of "unknown antiquity" that describes the good society in which all members function jointly to perform all its necessary tasks, and the bad society where this harmony has broken down. In this latter state, individuals perform their functions without a sense of their social value. For example, "[t]he planter, who is Man sent out into the field to gather food, is seldom cheered by any idea of the true dignity of his ministry. He sees his bushel and his cart, and nothing beyond, and sinks into the farmer, instead of Man on the farm" (82-83). Similar accounts follow for the priest, the tradesman, the attorney, the mechanic, the soldier, and for the scholar. "In the right state he is Man Thinking"; but in "the degenerate state," Emerson continues, the scholar "tends to become a mere thinker, or still worse, the parrot of other men's thinking" (84). As philosophy teachers, we do what we can to advance the possibilities of the good society where harmony might prevail. We try to make our students more cognizant of the fullness of experience and of their obligations to others. We try to produce scholars, not 'mere thinkers' or 'parrots.'

Continued on page 11
When most Americans in the 18-22 age bracket first study classical liberalism they are not exactly impressed. Because they have grown up surrounded by the language of liberalism, they have difficulty appreciating the true meaning of the concepts. “We agree with this,” most of them will say, “but then doesn’t everybody? Isn’t this just obvious?” Suddenly an instructor may find herself disoriented: the students think the material is too easy. This situation presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand a philosophy teacher gets the rare chance to talk about something that his students have heard of, which provides a welcome escape from the blank stares that inevitably accompany discussions of “validity,” “ontology” and “eudaimonia.” But on the other hand that same familiarity that students bring to the topic can lead to a self-assured boredom that keeps them from fully appreciating ideas that affect their lives on a daily basis.

To help students appreciate these ideas I have found a recent film to be extremely helpful. *Citizen Ruth* presents a picture of contemporary American life which can be used very productively as a case study in classical liberalism. In this essay I will describe how the film can be employed to clarify the principles of John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, since that text is the most common vehicle for teaching classical liberalism in introductory classes. To begin in section (I) I will say something briefly about the history and the content of the film, and then in section (II) I will discuss how the film can be used as a tool for teaching the principles of classical liberalism, especially with regard to paternalism and the separation between public and private domains.

(I) The Film

*Citizen Ruth* first appeared in theaters in December of 1996. It was directed by Alexander Payne, who also co-wrote the script. Laura Dern stars as Ruth, and she is joined by an excellent supporting cast, including: Mary Kay Place, Swoosie Kurtz, Kelly Preston, Kurtwood Smith, and Burt Reynolds. The movie was released on video in June of 1997 by Miramax Video. The running time is 105 minutes.

The film tells the story of one Ruth Stoops, a young woman with a very interesting life. When we first meet Ruth she is in her twenties, homeless, and the mother of four children who have been removed from her care by the state. Her main passion in life is drugs, especially anything that she can inhale (model airplane glue, touch-up paint, brake fluid, etc.). After inhaling spray paint behind a hardware store, Ruth is picked up by the police and charged—for the 16th time—with hazardous vapor inhalation. At the same time it is discovered that she is pregnant with her fifth child. The judge in the case decides to charge Ruth with endangering the life of her fetus—a felony—but outside the courtroom he takes her aside and tells her that if she will go to the doctor and “take care of this problem” he will drop the charges. This unconventional arrangement pushes Ruth into the public spotlight. She becomes the reluctant symbol of America’s most divisive issue, a symbol that both sides of the abortion controversy would like to claim as their own. The rest of the film follows Ruth’s journey through both the pro-life and the pro-choice camps as they attempt to use her to advance their own political agendas.

That journey begins when Ruth is discovered in the women’s holding cell by four pro-life activists, freshly arrested for harassing the local abortion clinic. When they hear her story they are outraged that the judge would pressure her to get an abortion, and so they arrange to pay her bail. They take Ruth home to stay with Norm and Gail Stoney, the leaders of a pro-life group called the “Baby Savers.” The Stoneys take Ruth to the Baby Savers’ weekly protest at the abortion clinic, and also arrange for her to visit the “Tender Care Pregnancy Center” where she is subjected to a barrage of anti-abortion propaganda. In the meantime, while they will not allow reporters to speak to Ruth, they are not at all reluctant to speak for her, announcing to the media that Ruth has decided to give up drugs and keep her baby.

Ruth, however, has a hard time living up to the Stoneys’ high expectations. Seemingly unaware of their attempts to redeem her, she steals money from the family and escapes from the house whenever she can to party and take drugs. After one such episode she is kidnapped by Diane Sieglar, a pro-choice activist who has infiltrated the Baby Savers in order to spy on them. Ruth now finds herself under the protection of a pro-choice group that is just as eager to see her have an abortion as the Baby Savers were to prevent it. Like the Stoneys, Diane and her friends
do not hesitate to speak on Ruth's behalf, to tell her exactly what is in her own best interest, and to make her an unwilling symbol of their cause.

In the midst of these two warring factions, Ruth—who otherwise would be a very disagreeable character—emerges as the unlikeliest of American heroes. Though she is highly irresponsible, even criminally negligent, has four children that she doesn’t care about, lives a very unhealthy lifestyle, and is not very bright, it is nevertheless easy to sympathize with Ruth because she is obviously being taken advantage of, and because she has a keen understanding of individual freedom—which everyone else in the film seems to lack. “I loved the idea of playing a protagonist who is completely without morals but is the only one in the film you end up being able to relate to,” said Laura Dern of the character she portrayed in the movie. Fittingly, Ruth finds a way in the end to outwit all of her protectors. By the end of the film, both the pro-choice and the pro-life camps have offered Ruth a $15,000 bribe to come over to their side (ostensibly so that her homelessness will not play a part in her decision of whether to keep or abort her baby). On the morning before she is scheduled to have an abortion, however, Ruth has a miscarriage. She tries to tell her hosts before they take her to the clinic, but as usual no one is listening. So Ruth, no longer pregnant, goes to the clinic anyway—followed by an army of protesters, takes the $15,000 that has been left in a bag for her by the pro-choice group, climbs out a bathroom window, and then (in a truly classic scene) walks right past the front door of the clinic where hundreds of pro-life and pro-choice activists are waving signs and demonstrating about her case—but no one even notices her because they are too busy shouting at each other. As the film ends Ruth is seen running down a dirt the road, with the bag of cash slung over her shoulder, leaving the shouts of the demonstrators behind her.

(II) Using the Film to Teach Classical Liberalism

Citizen Ruth is not really about abortion. This is manifest first of all by the fact that the film is a comedy. Whatever one's opinion may be on abortion, it is definitely not a laughing matter. But this film is extremely funny, so it follows that it must not really be a film about abortion. Secondly, it is important to note that by the time the film ends Ruth is not even pregnant. Her miscarriage in the final ten minutes of the movie provides final confirmation of what has been obvious for some time: that pregnancy and motherhood are not the real issues in this story. The real issue is how everyone who surrounds Ruth is using her in the name of personal freedom. Both the Baby Savers and the pro-choice activists who want to be Ruth’s protectors agree (this is the only thing they agree on) that her pregnancy is a private matter and that they are only interested in defending her personal freedom. This, anyway, is what they say, at several different points in the film. They announce this conviction to the press and to anyone else who is listening to justify their involvement in Ruth’s life; yet in spite of their libertarian language, their interest in Ruth is extremely paternalistic. What the film presents is a picture of contemporary Americans invoking the concepts of classical liberalism without understanding them. The abortion controversy provides an excellent stage for playing out this confusion, because it is the single most divisive topic in American politics—the issue on which people are most likely to become entrenched and emotionally involved, so that they lose track of the meaning of the arguments they are using.

This confusion between what the characters say and what they mean offers students an excellent opportunity both to sharpen their critical thinking skills, and to gain a better appreciation of the concepts of classical liberalism that are so commonly repeated in contemporary America, but so rarely understood. When students are asked to analyze Citizen Ruth in terms of the principles of Mill’s On Liberty, they are forced to bracket their own feelings about pregnancy and abortion (which are most likely quite strong), and evaluate the mistreatment of Ruth by both the pro-choice and the pro-life camps. In other words, students are challenged to shift their focus from maternity, from “maternalism”—which is what the film seems to be about—to paternalism—which is what the film is really about.

By paternalism I mean treating an adult like a child. This is the simplest formulation of what the concept means for Mill, and it is a formulation that students can readily apprehend and appreciate. On Liberty places great emphasis on the separation between childhood and maturity, and on the idea that adults deserve to be treated with the respect that is due a rational being, even if they make choices that seem irrational. “Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion,” Mill writes. “But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion . . . compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.”

Submissions to AAPT News

Submissions on disk or as e-mail binary attachments are much appreciated. Most major PC word processor file formats are fine, but WordPerfect (5.1 and later), Microsoft Word for Windows 6.0 (Word for Windows 98 is awkward), and Microsoft Word for Macintosh 6.0 are preferred. I prefer MS-DOS but both DOS and Macintosh diskette formats can be read. If you submit a file on a Mac diskette, be sure to save your file in text (ASCII) format in case we can't read your word processor's file format. Please include a paper copy of your submission.

Files may be sent as e-mail from virtually any e-mail system to bdecyk@csulb.edu, or by FAX to (562) 985-7135. If you need help, call me at (562) 985-4346.—Betsy Decyk

• 5 •
It is important for students to understand that what separates adults from children for Mill is simply the capacity to be improved by rational argument. One remains an adult even if this capacity is regularly ignored. If there are adults who do not seem to act like adults—if they seem to make choices that are consistently not in their best interest, and if they resist the efforts of others to persuade them to take better care of themselves—then their choices must still be respected and defended, as long as they do not harm anyone else. Mill gives two main reasons to support this conclusion. First of all, it is inconsistent for society to use coercion to pattern the choices of adults, since it had the opportunity to do that earlier, when they were children. Society, Mill asserts, has “absolute power” over children: “it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life.” Consequently, “[If society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the consequences.” Secondly, the community at large cannot pretend to be in a better position to understand what is really good for an individual than the individual is herself. Each individual “is the person most interested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person . . . can have in it, is trifling . . . with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else.”

For these reasons Mill argues that adults should be reasoned with but never coerced when they make choices that affect only themselves. They should never be treated like children, even though they may act childish. There are many ways of treating an adult like a child, and Citizen Ruth presents several examples of this kind of treatment. Here are just four of them, two from the pro-life camp, and two from the pro-choice camp. (This is by no means an exhaustive list; rather, these are just four scenes among many that students can be asked to analyze and discuss in order to get a better understanding of Mill’s theory.)

(1) When Gail Stoney delivers Ruth to the Tender Care Pregnancy Center, Ruth explains to the medical staff all of the reasons why she needs to have an abortion: because she is facing felony charges, because she is homeless, has no money, no way to take care of a child, and because her life is generally too messed up right now to have another baby. This is a clear and coherent argument, but the doctor and the nurse to whom she speaks don’t seem to hear anything that she says. Instead they talk on and on about how wonderful it will be when she has her baby. When Ruth finally shouts at them in exasperation (“Are you people deaf? I said I need to have an abortion!”), they stop talking to her altogether, and instead place her in front of a movie screen where she is bombarded with images of aborted fetuses. Ruth leaves the office overwhelmed by what she has seen. The medical authority figures at the Center have treated her just like a child: speaking to her condescendingly, ignoring her opinions, and finally responding to her arguments with a kind of coercive propaganda.

(2) On her first night with the Stneys, Ruth sneaks out of the house and spends the night partying. The next morning she stumbles to the breakfast table, sleep-deprived and seriously hung over from inhaling a can of touch-up paint. While she sits at the table with her head in her hands trying to summon the strength to eat something, Norm mentions to her that a reporter called that morning from the local newspaper. “He wanted to chat with you, of course, but I told him that you were resting, and that we weren’t quite prepared to make a statement yet anyway,” Norm says. “Is that OK with you Ruth? Ruth?” But Ruth doesn’t even hear him because she’s still half asleep and her head is throbbing. “Good,” Norm says, taking her lack of dissent as if it were consent. Once again, Ruth is treated like a child, who may not be capable of thinking and speaking for herself, instead of being respected as an adult who can think and speak for herself.

(3) Another scene closely mirroring (2) takes place at Diane Sieglar’s house, when Ruth is under the protection of the pro-choice group. When a reporter from ABC News calls wanting to talk to Ruth, Diane’s housemate immediately and angrily responds, (without asking Ruth’s opinion), “Ruth is not talking to any reporters. This is a private matter!” This scene also echoes a previous confrontation between Norm Stoney and a local reporter who had come to a Baby Savers protest to seek an interview with Ruth. In both of these cases the reporter is turned away with the same language: “Ruth’s pregnancy is a private matter.” In all three of these instances those who would be Ruth’s protectors assert their conviction that Ruth’s pregnancy is nobody’s business but her own—“a private matter”—and yet they refuse to let her deal with it privately, and they refuse to let Ruth speak for herself. The ironic distance between what the characters say and what they do in these scenes is readily apparent to students.

(4) Toward the end of the film, the Baby Savers increase their financial offer to Ruth, promising her $27,000 (nearly double the original offer of $15,000) if she will have her baby. Ruth, hearing about the new offer on the evening news, immediately starts to run out of Diane’s house to accept the money, screaming with joy. But Diane stops her and won’t let her leave. “I’ve spent nine months in a secret life with people I hate, and I’ve blown it all on you!” she says. “We have been up for 36 hours,” she continues, “making all the preparations [for Ruth’s abortion], and this is how you repay us!” Ruth responds with lines that she has learned well from her pro-choice protectors: “I don’t care! My body belongs to me!” But Diane still refuses to let her leave. Ruth is prevented from freely choosing what to do with her own body, which is precisely the kind of choice that Diane and her group say they are fighting to defend. Obviously the choice that Ruth wants to make in this instance is unprincipled and unreflective: she just wants the money, and she couldn’t care less about the political issues that are at stake. But it is still her choice, albeit an immature and shallow choice. While Diane’s pro-choice group officially proclaims its allegiance to Mill’s principle of individual liberty—“Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”—they dismiss Ruth’s personal choice when it threatens to undermine the
statement that they want to make about personal choice. Again, the irony that is latent in this scene is not lost on students.

To appreciate these and other instances of paternalism in the film, students also need to understand Mill's arguments concerning the separation of the public and private dimensions of an individual's life. According to Mill, these two dimensions are divided by the need to balance predictability with spontaneity. "In the conduct of human beings towards one another it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect," Mill writes; "but in each person's own concerns his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise." In order to avoid being surprised when we don't want to be surprised—when we find ourselves in public spheres in company that was not entirely of our own choosing—it is appropriate to regulate people's behavior with laws. Thus, the public domain becomes the region of prohibitions, required performances, and enforcement by means of punishment. If freedom is spontaneity, then we don't have any freedom in the public domain. Freedom is appropriately limited to the "sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest," where what a person does "affects only himself, or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation." A truly free society, according to Mill, is one that recognizes and respects three different kinds of freedom within this private domain: freedom of thought, freedom of association, and freedom to pursue one's own happiness however one wishes, as long as no one else is harmed.

The best way for beginning students to understand the public/private separation is to practice looking for the way that it is implemented in their own society in terms of what that society permits and does not permit by law. In Mill's formulation, any behavior that is either prohibited or required by law has been interpreted by society as public behavior—behavior where surprises will not be tolerated because of the potential to harm others. Mill insists that any society that draws the line between public and private incorrectly is not truly free, "whatever may be its form of government." When students turn Mill's theory on their own society they are led to understand its concepts better, and in the process they are often led to conclude that they don't really live in a free society, even though they thought that they did.

Several elements in the shoreline of Citizen Ruth help to facilitate this learning process. First of all, the separation between the public and the private domains is very clearly represented by the "injunction line" at the abortion clinic—the federal law that requires the protesters to stay fifty feet away from the property. So when the Baby Savers demonstrate at the clinic, students can see a picture of the private domain (the clinic, since under current American law abortion is protected as a private activity), and the public domain (the public street outside where the protesters march), which in this case are separated by a kind of "demilitarized zone" (the buffer zone created by the injunction line) that underscores the absolute separation that Mill insists on between the space of public coercion and the space of individual liberty to think, associate with others, and pursue one's own version of happiness. This is not to suggest that abortion necessarily should be protected as a private activity, only that under current American law it in fact is protected. The demonstration scene at the clinic offers a visual representation of what Mill is talking about in a positive sense, not in a normative sense. Once students understand the positive meaning of these concepts they can return to this scene to explore the more interesting normative question concerning the application of Mill's theory: "Should abortion be protected as a private activity?"

A discussion like that will often lead someone to bring up one of the main objections that Mill has to address in On Liberty, namely, the objection that an absolute separation of the public and the private is impossible—that private behavior always spills over into the public sphere. Mill's response to this objection is that one should be held responsible for any serious harm that one does to another, regardless of whether the behavior that led to the harm was public or private in nature. Following this logic Mill writes that a father who can no longer support his children financially, for example, should be held responsible for that public harm alone, regardless of whether he lost all his money gambling and supporting a mistress or investing in the stock market. In the case of a serious spillover like that, where the lives of others are badly harmed by an individual's behavior, Mill advocates punishment for the effects of the behavior regardless of whether the behavior itself was rooted in the public or the private domain. But when the spillover from the private to the public domain is not serious—when it is just a minor inconvenience "which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any individual except himself"—Mill argues that "the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom."

Citizen Ruth helps to illustrate several of the most important features of Mill's response to this important criticism of liberal theory. Ruth Stoops, who often chooses to pursue her individual happiness in the private domain by taking drugs and collapsing on the sidewalk, illustrates for students the kind of public inconveniences Mill is talking about. And when Mill argues that the only truly "good society" is one that tolerates such inconveniences "for the greater good of freedom," it is important for students to understand that such a "good society" will not always look very good on the surface. The picture of daily life presented by Citizen Ruth (which was filmed in unglamorous sections of Omaha, Nebraska, on exclusively overcast days) can help students to appreciate that the "good society" which Mill envisions is often ugly, dirty, and somewhat dangerous. All of this can open the door to more critical discussions concerning both the costs and the benefits of structuring a society on the liberal model.

Finally, it is a useful exercise for students to analyze and discuss how Ruth's activities are categorized by her society—when her behavior is taken to be public and when it is taken to be private. As a citizen on the margins of her community, Ruth's
character gives students a unique opportunity to think critically about how the public/private line is drawn in contemporary American society. For example, does it really make sense, according to classical liberal principles, that Ruth’s use of inhalants like model glue and spray paint is regarded as a public activity (since there are laws against it), while her use of alcohol is not? Is this consistent? Should it make any difference if Ruth is pregnant? (She has been arrested fifteen times before, when she was not pregnant, for hazardous vapor inhalation before the judge decides to charge her with criminal endangerment of her fetus.) Is Ruth really granted freedom of thought by her community? Are her opinions respected, even when they are so obviously thoughtless? Does freedom of thought entail the freedom to be stupid? Why is it that Ruth is free to have an abortion, yet not free, in most American states, to have sex in any way that she wants? (The so-called sodomy laws of most states, while generally unenforced, technically place much of an individual’s sex life in the public domain.) Ruth’s personal choices and the way they are limited and defined by current laws naturally raise questions like these, which can provoke students to ask whether contemporary America is really as liberal as they imagined. And if they conclude that American society has not yet fully embraced the principles of Mill’s theory, then they can appreciate better the relevance that the theory still has today.

I have found these two principles—the meaning of paternalism and the difference between public and private activities—to be the keys to unlocking a student’s understanding of On Liberty. Citizen Ruth contains several elements that can be used to illustrate and clarify these principles, and also to provoke a more critical discussion of their meaning in contemporary America. I have used Citizen Ruth in several courses to teach classical liberalism, and in each case it has been an unmitigated success. Students love the film because the story is engaging, contemporary, and funny; I love the film because it is so effective at helping students to think more clearly and critically about the liberal principles that they believe they already understand.19

NOTES

1Instructors wishing to use Citizen Ruth to teach liberalism will easily find illustrations of other liberal principles in the movie. As I argue later on, the entire film is a study of personal freedom and how it is viewed in contemporary America. My focus on paternalism and the public/private separations is intended to suggest two starting points that I have found to be particularly useful in teaching beginning students. I should also note that I’ve made no attempt to discuss how this film could be used in classrooms outside of the U.S.—although I’m sure it could be. My interest in this paper is to explore the problem of teaching classical liberalism to American students at an American university, given that these students in this particular classroom setting tend to take liberal political thought for granted. I have no doubt that instructors in any liberal society confront the same general problem, but I cannot pretend to address the particular nuances of those classroom situations, since all of my teaching experience has been within the United States.


3On a purely technical note, it is worth mentioning that, at 105 minutes, the film divides nicely into two 50-minute class periods. The first 50 minutes take you through Ruth’s stay with the Stoneys, right up to the point where she is kidnapped by Diane Sieglar, fast forward through 5 minutes in the second part of the film (which all takes place with Ruth in the custody of the pro-choice group), and it will fit perfectly in the remaining class period.


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Call for Book Reviews

Although many journals have sections dedicated to reviewing new books in philosophy, rarely (if ever!) is there an opportunity to discuss how well those books actually work in the classroom, or how a certain software program (or movie, video, game, novel, etc.) can be used in the classroom to deepen understanding and enhance discussion of philosophical issues. So, here’s the chance! Whether you have been using a text (film, etc.) for years or have only experimented with it for one semester, we are interested in whether you would recommend it and why. General guidelines we have for submissions to the new review section are the following:

- materials reviewed must have actually been used by you in the classroom; and reviews should include:
  - a description of the use you made of the materials
  - a discussion of student responses to the materials
  - a summary of the results
  - reviews should be 500 to 1000 words long*

That’s it! Please send submissions to:

Nancy Slonneger Hancock  
Executive Director, AAPT  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Louisville  
Louisville, KY 40292  
Internet: aapt@juno.com

*If you are interested in commenting on what you have found to be useful in the classroom, but do not wish to write a full-length (i.e., 500–1000 word) review, you might consider writing a summary for “The Bulletin Board” in this newsletter.
Reflections on Philosophy, on Teaching, and on Teaching Philosophy

When asked to write something for this Newsletter, expressing my thoughts as incoming President, my first reaction was what to say and from which perspective—as philosopher, as teacher, or as incoming President. Thinking about my Presidency, it struck me that my term of office will end at the very moment we enter the next millennium. I shall be the last President for this millennium. From that perspective, I thought it best that I both reflect and project. This letter is one of reflection.

Let me begin with “philosophy.” Each day as I step into the classroom, I wrestle with the meaning of this activity we call philosophy, and I keep recalling one word as a response, and perhaps as a resolution to this quandary. That word is nisus. I dare say that many will find this word unfamiliar and may be thumbing through the OED at this very moment. If you have done this, or if you are one of those few who can recall Hume's use of the term, you will find that it refers to a striving or an endeavor. Philosophy is an endeavor, it is a conative activity, it is a way in which we move our lives forward, perhaps toward those ideals which give our individual lives meaning and direction.

Philosophy, then, should have practical application to our “lived experiences.” Whatever else it may be, philosophy should be that which speaks from and to the “lived experiences” of us all—teacher, student, worker, politician—the everyday person “striving” for what may be the good life. The answer is simple and straightforward, viz., philosophy is not something which can or should reside merely in abstract theorization, nor in the isolated dialogues of academics, nor in written dissertations, nor in journalistic disputations. We may need to return to the wisdom of our Athenian forebears and think of philosophy, once again, as an “applied science,” an activity in which theory and practice should converge. Even in a later time Kant would realize that the proper role of philosophy would be to make practical the means to the truth.1 “Philosophy,” if it is to have any value, any meaning, must have application to problems in business, government, education, and even family life. To philosophize is to engage in a living, breathing endeavor.

This brings me to my second reflection—what is teaching? Here I find my reflection taking me to re-read two essays by Northrop Frye: “The Teacher’s Source of Authority,” and “The Definition of a University.”2 In the first essay, Frye reminds us “that the primary source of authority in the Humanities, as everywhere else, is neither the teacher nor the student, but the subject being taught” (Divisions 128). A teacher is but a trans-parent medium for the subject matter. Frye reinforces this idea in the second essay when he argues that “the essential democratic principle in education is the supremacy of the subject over both the teacher and the student, and the more supreme it is, the more the difference between the teacher and the student is minimized” (151). The teacher is also student and the student may also be teacher. Teaching cannot be reading from dusty old notes; it cannot be a monologue of apparent authority. Teaching is engaging in dialogue with the other at the level of shared lived experiences. “Education,” as Frye puts it, “should be defined as an encounter with real life” (148). Teaching is a passionate engagement in life, a life which is held in common with my students.

“Teaching philosophy,” therefore, is nothing less than a striving to move away from the appearances which try to govern our lives and shape our experiences toward those ideals which lie beyond what Heidegger called everydayness. It moves beyond idle talk and empty monological abstraction which tries to disguise itself as “scholarship.” It may be more like the fellowship of The Symposium than we dare admit. But above all, it is a community endeavor, a nisus shared by teacher and students. It is also a moral endeavor, but that, perhaps, should be the topic of my next letter.

NOTES

2 Both can be found in Divisions on a Ground: Essays on Canadian Culture (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1982).
1. Notice of New Address for AAPT

Please note that the AAPT home office has a new address. All membership dues and correspondence should be sent to:

Dr. Nancy S. Hancock, Executive Director
American Association of Philosophy Teachers
Department of Philosophy
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292

2. Business Meeting Minutes

The meeting was called to order on July 30, 1998, at the 12th International Workshop and Conference on Teaching Philosophy, held at Mansfield University.

A. Jim Campbell (President) reported on recent activities of the AAPT:

- The National Office of the AAPT has moved to the University of Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky. Correspondence and all membership dues should be sent to Dr. Nancy S. Hancock, Executive Director, American Association of Philosophy Teachers, Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292. Or, you may contact the Executive Director by phone at 502-852-0453, or e-mail at aapt@juno.com.
- The AAPT has been successful with its preconference workshops at APA meetings. These workshops have been cosponsored by the APA, whose assistance is greatly appreciated. We plan to continue offering these workshops.
- We are currently organizing AAPT sessions at the upcoming APA meetings for all three divisions. Anyone interested in participating should contact the Executive Director, who will forward your names to the responsible members.
- The AAPT will be represented at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy in Boston.

B. The membership elected the following people to the Nominating Committee: Gary Talsky, Betsy Decyk, Donna Engelmann, and Daryl Close. The Nominating Committee is responsible for securing nominations for each open office, and for coordinating the election.

C. The AAPT announced opportunities for members to participate in the Association as: Vice President, At-Large Members of the Board, coordinators for workshops and sessions at APA conferences, and Newsletter Editor(s). Vice President and At-Large Member are both positions filled by election. Interested members should contact the Nominating Committee as soon as possible if they wish to be included on the ballot. Members interested in participating in other ways should contact the Executive Director.

D. Daryl Close reported on the duties of the Newsletter Editor(s). Daryl and Mark Lenssen have been the editors for 14 years and will be resigning at the end of the conference. The editor is responsible for publishing three (3) newsletters each year—November, March, and July. The editor works over the phone and via e-mail with the typesetter (Philosophy Documentation Center). The major task is actively seeking out contributions for each issue.

E. Betsy Decyk distributed copies of the “Statement on the Growing Use of Part-Time and Adjunct Faculty” and the list of “Good Practices” published in AAUP’s Academe, Jan/Feb, 1998, and moved that the AAPT accept and endorse them. Discussion followed. Questions were raised regarding the inclusion of a statement from the AAPT concerning how the use of adjuncts affects the quality of philosophy education; a coherent policy from the AAPT concerning not only adjuncts but also distance learning and corporate involvement in education; and how the AAPT might best “get at the ‘powers that be’” concerning the statement. As a result of discussion, the motion was amended regarding the inclusion of a statement from the AAPT concerning how the use of adjuncts affects the quality of philosophy education; a coherent policy from the AAPT concerning not only adjuncts but also distance learning and corporate involvement in education; and how the AAPT might best “get at the ‘powers that be’” concerning the statement. After a result of discussion, the motion was amended and included to include notification by the AAPT to various professional organizations, such as the AAUP and the APA. The motion was tabled and will be placed on the fall ballot.

F. Nancy Hancock, the Executive Director, was asked to write letters of thanks to all those who were involved in the local arrangements for the 12th IWCTP at Mansfield University. Bob Timko has agreed to compile a list of all those who should be included and forward their addresses to Nancy.

G. Finally, the Board of Officers of the AAPT unanimously passed the following resolution:

Whereas Professor Shokichi Uto has demonstrated a distinguished career in teaching and service in philosophy, and
Whereas Professor Uto has been a loyal member of the Association for more than twenty years, and
Whereas Professor Uto has faithfully attended every International Workshop Conference on Teaching Philosophy since the first meeting in 1976,

The Board of Officers of the American Association of Philosophy Teachers confers upon Professor Uto the highest recognition within its power—Honorary Member of the American Association of Philosophy Teachers.

The resolution was signed by all the members of the Board of Officers: James Campbell (President), Robert Timko (Vice President), Betsy Decyk (Past President), Richard Hart (Treasurer), Louisa Moon (At-Large Member), H. Phillips Hamlin (At-Large Member), Arnold Wilson (At-Large Member), Daryl Close (Newsletter Editor), and
When I began, I promised to try to discuss something important. I think that I have, although I also recognize that most of what I have said is hardly news to members of the American Association of Philosophy Teachers. I do suspect, however, that the model of the scholar that Emerson offers might be new to some of you and that, in any case, this model can be of assistance to you when you return to your classrooms in the next few weeks to face your young scholars.

NOTES


4 One clear exception would be Emerson’s fellow Concordian, Henry David Thoreau, who had graduated from Harvard at twenty years of age the day before.


Executive Director (Continued)

Nancy Hancock (Executive Director). A formal certificate will be drawn up and mailed to Professor Uto.

3. Activities of the Board
A. The Board appointed Gary Talsky as the new Treasurer of the Association. As soon as Richard Hart has closed the books on the 12th IWCTP, he will begin the process of transferring all accounts and records to Gary.

B. The Board voted to form an advisory committee of graduate students.

C. Debra Penna-Fredericks, Betsy Decyk, and Anne Bezdek have agreed to coordinate the AAPT sessions at the Central Division APA meeting in New Orleans. Jim Friel will coordinate the sessions at the Eastern APA, and Louisa Moon will work with Jim Cadello on the Pacific APA sessions.

D. Betsy Decyk has agreed to be the interim Newsletter Editor for the fall issue.

E. The Board decided to place a motion on the ballot which would introduce a new membership category for part-time and adjunct faculty. The dues for this category would be equivalent to those for graduate student and emeritus members.

4. Election Results
On January 1, 1999
- Our current Vice President—Bob Timko—will be installed as President of the Association
- Arnold Wilson will be installed as Vice President
- Phil Hamlin, Martin Benjamin and Amy Baehr will be installed as At-Large Members of the Board.

The membership also voted to APPROVE both motions on the ballot. As a result, the AAPT will begin notifying organizations of our endorsement of the “Statement on the Growing Use of Part-Time and Adjunct Faculty” and “Good Practices.” Effective immediately, the category of “Part-Time or Adjunct” member will be added to the membership form.

I hope that everyone is having an enjoyable and productive fall semester, and that you are all making good use of the new skills, information and knowledge you acquired at the conference in Mansfield. As always, it was a pleasure to spend time with you!
Calendar of Events


December 28, 1998 — APA Comm. on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy (with APA), 2–5 p.m., Georgetown Ballroom East. Topic: “Performatve Methods of Teaching Logic to (Younger) Students.”


(Continued on page 11)
American Association of Philosophy Teachers

Membership Application

All memberships expire at the end of the calendar year. The expiration date of your membership will be listed on the address label for each newsletter. If you have any questions about the status of your membership, please feel free to contact the Executive Director at aapt@juno.com or by writing to Dr. Nancy S. Hancock, Executive Director, AAPT, Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292.

MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIES AND RATES

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Lifetime memberships are also available for $500, which may be paid in installments over the period of one year.

Please detach and return this form with your membership dues to: Dr. Nancy S. Hancock, Executive Director, American Association of Philosophy Teachers, Department of Philosophy, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292.

Name: ____________________________
Address: __________________________
City: ____________________________ State/Province: ____________ Country: ________________
Zip (+4): ________________ Phone (W): ______________________ (H): __________________
E-mail: _________________________

Is this a renewal _______ or new membership _______?

Please check membership type: _ Regular _ Student _ Emeritus _ Part-time/Adjunct

TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED: $ _________
APA / AAPT Workshops
APA Central Division Meeting, New Orleans
Friday May 7, 1999

Session I  9:00 am to noon

9:00 – 9:10 Coffee

9:15 – 9:30 Welcome to Session I
   Eric Hoffman, Executive Director, APA
   Robert Timko, Mansfield University

9:30 – 10:30 WORKSHOP: Learning Communities
   Nancy Hancock, University of Louisville

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee and networking

10:45 – noon TUTORIAL: Single-Subject Introduction to Philosophy
   V. Alan White, University of Wisconsin, Manitowoc
   Mark Brown, University of Wisconsin, Marathon
   Dean Kowalski, Clarke College

Noon – 1:45 Break for lunch

Session II  1:45 – 4:45 p.m.

1:45 – 2:00 Welcome Session II
   Gary Talsky, Sacred Heart School of Theology

2:00 – 3:30 TUTORIAL: Using Film Segments to Teach about Professional Responsibility
   H. Phillips Hamlin, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
   Marianne Woodside, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
   Glenn Graber, University of Tennessee, Knoxville

3:30 – 3:45 Networking

3:45 – 4:45 OPEN DISCUSSION: The Design of the Undergraduate Major in Philosophy
   Moderators: Betsy Decyk, California State University, Long Beach
   Robert Timko, Mansfield University