Call for Workshop Proposals Issued for 1990

The 8th International Workshop/Conference on Teaching Philosophy will be held August 6-10, 1990, at Indiana University in Bloomington, IN. Workshop proposals should be sent to:

H. Phillips Hamlin
Program Chair, 8th IWCTP
Department of Philosophy
The University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37996-0480
Office: (615) 974-3255
Home: (615) 588-0000

Workshops on teaching any area, problem, or aspect of philosophy are welcome. Also welcome are workshops about evaluating teaching and learning; special types or classes of students (children, prisoners, the elderly, high school students, factory workers, students in technical schools, and others); special methods, materials, and/or techniques for teaching; etc. This list is not meant to be exhaustive -- if you have innovative ideas about teaching, organize them into a proposal; the Program Chair invites you to consult with him.

Workshop proposal submissions must be sent in triplicate and organized as follows:

On a cover page:
(1) Your name, school affiliation (if any), address, phone number.
(2) Title and area (problems, technique, etc.) of proposed workshop.
(3) Anticipated length (60, 90, 120 minutes are the ones most easily scheduled).
(4) One-paragraph abstract (100-300 words) to be used to describe your workshop, if accepted, in the program.

On subsequent pages:
(1) A detailed account of your workshop: what it covers and seeks to achieve, its methods and techniques, what the participants will do and experience (remember, ours is a workshop conference, thus we discourage reading papers at each other), list of handouts and materials, etc.
(2) Description of the role and place of this workshop's topic in the overall theme of teaching philosophy.
(3) List of equipment you will need.
(4) Anything else which the program committee might need to know.

Any questions about these items should be directed to the Program Chair. Write or call.
There seems to be more than a little college professor bashing these days in the public press (Charles J. Sykes, ProfScur: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education, with various reviews, editorials, and responses, and Michael I. Sovern, "Higher Education - The Real Crisis," New York Times, Jan. 22 with letters and counter-letters following, Feb. 19 and March 19.)

The charges are the usual ones: we do not work very hard (only 6-12 hours per week, with summers off), we are not very good at what we do (we are not succeeding in teaching students the old-style "great men" curriculum and we do not train them to be good sports in the corporate game, either), and besides that, we are overpaid.

When the allegations come from someone outside the profession, we have to conclude that he does not know what he is talking about; when they come from within the ranks, we conclude that either he is making shameful confessions about himself or is taking a holier-than-thou attitude and aiming pot shots at others.

How, then, do we defend ourselves against such charges? Or, to be perfectly fair and keep our minds open to the possibility that some of what they say may be true, how do we find out?

One way to find out how much time we spend at work, if not how hard or how successfully, would be to undertake an empirical study. How do professors spend their time? Does it vary with type of institution, age, rank, and over the different disciplines? In particular, how do teachers of philosophy spend their time?

My problem with this approach is that I am not always sure in this special life of ours what counts as "working." When I am teaching a class or reading exams, I know I am working at my profession. But there are other things I spend time on that I am not sure how to categorize. Let me give some examples.

The other day I spent an hour or so in the library looking up new topics and readings for a class I will teach in the fall. Now, this is a course I have taught before, very successfully by student and departmental standards. I am not sure that the new readings will improve the syllabus or my understanding of the issues. But I was curious; I wanted to read them. So was I "working" when I spent that time in the library, or was I being self-indulgent, reading for my own enjoyment?

Well, it was philosophy, you might say. It was not, after all, a novel I was reading. But, I ask, what if it had been a novel, and then many weeks later, I had spontaneously used a character from that novel to illustrate a point I was making in class? Would that then make the novel-reading count as working time?

There are many, many other examples where the line between work and non-work begins to blur for the philosophy teacher. Advising students about course selection is clearly part of my work; but my students, after they have discussed their academic programs, also want to discuss with me what is going on in the dorms or how their summer job search is progressing or the latest scandals in Washington. Am I then talking as teacher, advisor, or friend? And does being a friend to students count as "work?"

Plato distinguishes in the Republic between the role of the shepherd as caretaker of sheep and the role of shepherd as wage-earner for his family. We, too, play different roles in life: as teachers, citizens, parents, members of religious communities. My point is that these are not always separate roles. What I learn by being a parent to my own children helps me to be a better teacher for other people’s children; what I learn by exercising my role as citizen or community volunteer shapes my experience and makes me the whole person my students relate to as teacher, advisor, and friend.

A teacher is a whole person and teaches with her or his whole being. The line between work and play (Continued on Pg. 13)
AAPT Meets in Chicago With APA

The AAPT session at the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, held in Chicago in April, featured a presentation by Professor James S. Kelly, of Elmhurst College, on "Structured Student Discussions." The presentation came from a longer paper, entitled "Makers of Meaning." Professor Kelly wishes to help his beginning students become makers of meaning, that is, "active agents who engage the world," rather than passive recipients and memorizers. Kelly proposes "... a structured discussion format which aids the development of agency and enhances critical thinking and social skills."

Kelly's structured discussion format uses his version of forms by J. Hansen and C. E. Nelson, which rely on ideas from W. F. Hill, *Learning through Discussion*. One form is a detailed eleven-page worksheet which helps the student in the process of understanding and analyzing an assigned article and then evaluating it. Questions on the worksheet include, for example, the following one:

"7. CONTEXTUAL EVALUATION. How adequate is the article when compared to what else you know? Do you know of other relevant data and, if so, do they tend to support or refute the author's claims? Are the pertinent alternative hypotheses and approaches clearly stated and adequately excluded?"

The worksheet is designed to be used by students both as they read their assignment in preparation for class and again as they participate in small discussion groups in class. Students, having filled out the worksheet on their own, add to the worksheet from class discussion, using a different color of ink than they had used previously. The final page of the worksheet evaluates the performance of the discussion group and its members. The other form that Kelly gives to his students is a ten-page set of directions for using the worksheet. It is primarily a guide for small group discussion and is certainly very useful for students, especially those who have not had a course dealing with principles of small group discussion.

According to Professor Kelly, the first three weeks of the course focus on developing students' abilities in critical reading and reasoning as they become familiar with the structured discussion technique. Use of the worksheets continues throughout the course as students become increasingly able to focus on the content of the articles which they read. With the structured discussion technique the onus for learning falls on the students, not on the instructor as a provider of information.

Kelly's presentation was followed by an animated discussion. I have emphasized parts of his presentation which provoked discussion. This is the first year that group meetings at the Central APA have been held in "prime time," rather than in the evening. Unfortunately, the time slots were only one hour long, so we had to end while discussion was still going well. Perhaps in the future, longer midday time slots will be made available.

by Dale Schnetzer
Bowling Green State University/Firelands,
Huron, OH 44839

AAPT Board Meeting Minutes

The following is a brief version of the minutes of the AAPT Board meeting, held at the Palmer House, April 29, 1989 (during the Central Division APA Meeting).

1. Present: Rosalind Ladd (President, AAPT) presiding, Richard Wright (Executive Director), Nelson Pole (Past President), Arnold Wilson (At-Large Board Member), Jim Campbell (At-Large Board Member), Phil Hamlin (Program Chair, 1990 Conference) recording, and for a portion of the meeting, Martin Benjamin and Dale Schnetzer. (Board meetings are frequently held at Eastern and Central Division APA meetings and all members of AAPT are invited to attend these meetings.)

2. Plans for the 1990 Conference were discussed in detail, including: having a business manager for the conference, the contract with Indiana University Conference Bureau, estimated expenses, dates of the conference (set at August 6-10, 1990), modifications in the program, subsidizing child care, arranging transportation to and from airport, possible keynote and/or theme speakers.

3. AAPT business discussed included: terms for officers and changes in the constitution, the financial condition of AAPT (using a report submitted by Frans van der Bogert, Treasurer), support for a West Coast version of the workshop conference, changing format and frequency of newsletters, obtaining a bulk-mailing permit for Richard Wright in Oklahoma, plans to apply for grant money for funding travel and special programs (at the 1990 conference) for graduate students and teaching assistants, setting up a special two-year membership for AAPT running concurrently with the conferences, setting up an operational account for AAPT at the University of Oklahoma.

4. Questions about any items mentioned above should be addressed to either Phil Hamlin (615) 974-3255 or to Rosalind Ladd (617) 285-7722.
This column is under the supervision of Mary Ann Carroll, Appalachian State University. Readers are urged to share their own QQS with or without commentary. Responses to commentaries and QQS are invited.

We at The QQs Center are always looking for new answers to old questions. You know the old question Ayer answers about how empirical questions can be raised about analytic statements? Well, we found a new answer if you happen to be talking about plane geometry:

"An empirical question could be raised about plane geometry because we do not know if different planes of existence really exist."

(However, this is proof that there is at least one other plane of existence.)

How about this old question: Why is "whatever God says" an inadequate answer to "How can we know right from wrong?" The new answer is "Because not everyone is Catholic."

(from Arnold Wilson, University of Cincinnati)

Now suppose you were to count this new answer wrong. In an attempt to up the exam grade by two points or however many it’s worth (hey Arnold! how many was that one worth?), the student might accuse you of being too subjective and tell you that it’s just your personal opinion that the answer is wrong. That, however, is an old approach to the old problem of how to up an exam grade. A new approach by a student to this old problem might involve pointing out a conceptual link between the essence of language and knowledge:

"The essence of language is that what we know is what we think and we always use words that we know."

A careful analysis of this QQ reveals that if students think X then they know X and since they always use words they know, whatever X they write in their papers must be the truth, right? This new approach to an old problem of students is also a new approach to one of your old problems as well, namely, how to determine what students really know. (Note that you are justified in upping grades not only by two but also in giving everybody perfect scores, which will make you a really popular teacher and you’ll get lots of merit raises.) Besides, isn’t philosophy just a bunch of word games anyway? And aren’t word games language games? And if you’re going to talk about games, for crying out loud, how can you forget to mention fairness?!? How could Wittgenstein have overlooked such an obvious point?!? If he were still around, no doubt he’d want to thank the author of the following QQ for drawing out an implication of language games that even he didn’t notice:

"Wittgenstein’s theory of language intertwined with truth because in order to ‘play’ the language game one had to be fair."

Now what should you do if you catch someone playing the language game unfairly? Should you kick them out of the game and make them take their words and go home? Can you tell us what is the fairness status of the language game being played by this student in a report on a lecture?

"The presentation on medical ethics dealt with many important issues. And physician relations, abortion, and youth in Asia… He said youth in Asia deals with the act of deliberately putting to death a patient who is terminally ill. There are two kinds. There is active youth in Asia in which the terminally ill patient is not treated at all."

(from Ray Ruble, Appalachian State University)

Forget about having to be fair when playing the language game--what about the youth in Asia!

While we’re on the topic of language, we might as well talk about art, too:

"As the saying goes, ‘A picture is worth a million words.’"

(from Frans van der Bogert, Appalachian State University)

Which just goes to show you that inflation has hit art too; why, just a few years ago a picture was worth only a thousand words.

Students don’t get riled up if you talk about art as a language; but what if it is suggested that art can be likened to a religion?—holy moly!

"I disagree with Tom Wolfe (who says that art has become a religion) because I think people should give ten percent of their earnings to the Lord Jesus Christ. After all, it was him that woke those people up every

(Continued on Pg. 6)
### AAPT Financial Report

**1988 Calendar Year**


**I. Assets and Liabilities:**

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>Assets less liabilities 12/31/87</td>
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<td>Assets as of 12/31/87</td>
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<td>Difference between bank balances above</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

These figures and those which follow are based solely on withdrawals from and deposits to AAPT's bank account in Boone, NC. Assets for 1988 other than the bank account itself are computed on the basis of checks written in 1987 but applied to 1988 expenses. Liabilities for 1988 are computed on the basis of checks written in 1989 which were applied to expenses incurred in 1988. These figures do not include liabilities in the form of unreported outstanding reimbursable expenses from the 1988 Workshop/Conference. Nor does this account reflect unreported liabilities or assets connected with AAPT's operation at Cleveland State University.

**II. Income in 1988**

<table>
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<td>Unadjusted gross 1988 income</td>
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**III. Expenditures in 1988**

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<td>Total conference expenditures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philosophy Documentation Center (mailing labels)</td>
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**IV. Excess income over expenditures for 1988**

Funding for the June and October 1988 newsletter issues occurred out of AAPT's Cleveland State University account. No report of the exact costs of these issues or of the status of this account was available for inclusion in this report.

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<td>IV. Excess income over expenditures for 1988</td>
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Frans van der Bogert, AAPT Treasurer
Appalachian State University
May 19, 1989
Eisenhower Symposium Slated for April

The Eisenhower Symposium on Science, Technology and Policy will take place April 9-12th, 1990 at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas. This event will celebrate the centennial of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Kansan who is known for his coinage of the phrase “military-industrial complex,” and his Atoms for Peace speech. The Symposium will feature thirty leaders in the sciences and engineering, speaking about ethical and policy matters shaping their research projects and professional lives. The case histories and projects of the speakers will be researched by faculty-student teams and will form part of a planned videodisc which will include as well the panels, papers, and discussions at the Symposium. This disc will then be used in several computer applications to enrich the teaching of Engineering Ethics, and a Philosophy of Technology course.

While philosophers and social scientists will be involved in discussing the presentations at the Symposium, and will make some presentations of their own, the primary focus of this event will be the first-hand discussions and narratives of the scientists, engineers, and policy-makers in those areas. The discussions will follow up on two major ethical and policy questions: whether there is, and can be in our era, a free exchange of ideas in science and engineering; and secondly, how funding and research coordination policies influence topic choice and the direction of research in these fields.

AAPT members are invited to attend, and to enjoy the numerous events on the sidelines here on the tall grass prairie. Tours of the Eisenhower Center, Museum and Library, including political cartoon exhibit, as well as the world’s largest tall grass prairie preserve, will be conducted. AAPT members—or their colleagues -- teaching Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Ethics are urged to send a) suggestions for speakers in sciences and engineering, and b) commitments to come and participate in discussions, to Sarah A. Merrill, Ph.D., Applied Ethics Program, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506. If enough philosophers come, we can have a special session of our own following and analyzing the previous talks—and even an edited collection. You will have to find your own funding to come, unless a critical mass assembles to write our own grant. (NEH deadline is October.)

"Out of the Mouths of Babes" or "QQs"

(Continued from Pg. 4)

morning to make this money that they are contributing to art. Don't get me wrong, I am not criticizing art but I just think we should give ten percent of our income to the church. Then if we have money left, it can be given to art. I think art is great but what can art do for you in reality?"

Actually, we think the money should go to alarm clock manufacturers because they're the ones who wake us up every morning. And just for the record, Art can do just as much for you in reality as Bob or Dave, or the Dean, so what the heck?

We leave you with a QQ that, in a way, brings together some of the topics in this issue's column. And since here at the QQs Center we are always thinking of your welfare, may we suggest that you keep it on your bedside table to read on those nights when you're all caught up reading student papers and you have the opportunity to get a decent night's sleep but you'd feel guilty if you did and so you need something to keep you awake:

"An analytic normative claim is one which is true by definition but has some normalcy in the sense it's used normally by all and is rarely questioned ..."

Mary Ann Carroll
Appalachian State University
Boone, NC 28609

AAPT Treasurer’s Position Open For A Four-Year Appointed Term

The position of Treasurer of the American Association of Philosophy Teachers will become open at the end of the current Treasurer’s term of office. This is a volunteer position for a term of at least four years. The Treasurer is selected and appointed by the AAPT Board of Officers. For more information, write or call Rosalind Ekman Ladd, AAPT President, 72 Taber Avenue, Providence, RI, 02906, (401) 861-3824. Deadline for application: September 1, 1989.
Teaching Philosophy as Reconstructing Childhood

(This paper was presented at the AAPT session of the December 1988 APA meetings in Washington, D.C. We appreciate Professor Matthews' permission to reprint it here. Eds.)

In my book, Philosophy and the Young Child, I quote, almost without comment, the following passage from Susan Isaac's wonderful book, Intellectual Growth in Young Children. The passage is a transcription of a discussion in Isaac's school in Cambridge, England.

At lunch, the children talked about "the beginning of the world." Dan (six years, one month) insists, whatever may be suggested as "the beginning," there must always have been "something before that." He said, "you see, you might say that first of all there was a stone, and everything came from that --but" (with great emphasis) "where did the stone come from?" There were two or three variants on this theme. Then Jane (eleven years), from her superior store of knowledge, said, "Well, I have read that the earth was a piece of the sun, and that the moon was a piece of the earth." Dan, with an air of eagerly pouncing on a fallacy, "Ah! but where did the sun come from?" Tommy (five years, four months) who had listened to all this very quietly, now said with a quiet smile, "I know where the sun came from!" The others said eagerly, "Do you, Tommy? Where? Tell us." He smiled still more broadly, and said, "Shan't tell you!" to the vast delight of the others, who thoroughly appreciated the joke.

As anyone who has read, for example, Richard Sorabji's recent tome, Time, Creation, and the Continuum, should find Dan's reasoning familiar. It is, after all, an application of that ancient principle, ex nihilo nihil fit, to the vexing question of the origin of the universe. But then, since Sorabji's mammoth work is itself a discussion of almost all ancient and medieval cosmological and cosmogonical thinkers of any significance in our Western tradition, anyone familiar with the cosmologies of Parmenides, or Plato, or Aristotle, or Epicurus, or the Neoplatonists, or Augustine, Boethius, Philoponous, Aquinas, or any one of a very long list of ancient and medieval theorists, will also find Dan's reasoning familiar.

Perhaps equally interesting is Tommy's joke. Ex nihilo nihil fit is presumably an a priori principle rather than merely a generalization from experience. By claiming to know, yet refusing to divulge, the secret of where the sun came from, little Tommy tries to arrest the further application of ex nihilo nihil fit. Yet, of course, further information, even hitherto secret information, should be irrelevant to the point that Dan wants to insist on. On some level the children seem to appreciate this and laugh at Tommy's joke.

Here is another discussion of cosmogony. This time the group is a dozen third and fourth graders in my own philosophy discussion group in Newton, MA, some five years ago.

"Do you think there could be any such thing as the beginning of time?" I asked, for I had been trying to write a story about time travel.

"No," several of the kids replied.

Then Nick spoke up. "The universe is everything and everywhere," he announced, and then paused. "But then if there was a big bang or something, what was the big bang in?"

Nick's question has long puzzled me, too. In my own case, hearing lectures on the "big-bang" theory of the origin of the universe given by learned astrophysicists and cosmogonists has never quelled the conceptual worry that Nick articulated so simply and directly.

At the time of this discussion Nick had just turned nine years old. The others in the group were anywhere from nine to ten and a half.

Not only did Nick have a genuine puzzle about how the universe could have begun, he also had a metaphysical principle that required beginnings for everything, the universe included. Everything there is, he said, has a beginning. As he realized, that principle reintroduces the problem about the universe. "How did the universe start?" he kept asking.

"The universe," said Sam, "is what everything appeared on. It's not really anything. It's what other things started on."
"So there always has to be a universe?" I asked.
"Yeah," agreed Sam, "there always has to be a universe."

"So if there was always a universe," I went on, "there was no first time, either."

"There was a first time for certain things," explained Sam, "but not for the universe. There was a first time for the earth, there was a first time for the stars, there was a first time for the sun. But there was no first time for the universe."

"Can you convince Nick that the universe had to always be there?" I asked Sam.

Sam replied with a rhetorical question, "What would the universe have appeared on?" he asked simply.

"That's what I don't understand," admitted Nick.

Sam's conception of the universe (what everything else appears "on") is very much like Plato's idea of the "receptacle" in his dialogue, The Timaeus. ("... the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any way sensible things is not to be termed earth or air or fire or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things..." - Timaeus 51a) On this view the universe itself never came to be; it is what other things come to be in, or "on." If, as Ross, another child in the same group, put the point later on in our discussion, things "started out on vast blackness, then that's just the universe then; the universe is vast blackness."

In our discussion Nick never gave up his principle that everything there is has a beginning. But he remained puzzled about how this principle could be applied to the universe itself. Every time he was asked what the universe could have first appeared on, he replied with engaging candor, "That's the part I don't get." Of course it was he who first raised this problem with his principle that everything there is has a beginning.

As I hope you will recognize, it is common for young children to puzzle over what the universe is, and whether it had a beginning. My own personal puzzlement as a child of about five or six took the form of the following question: 'Given that God created the world at a particular time, how is it that the world looks as though it has been going on forever?'

I now know that my problem in cosmogony was a bit like that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Like me, Aquinas accepted the Christian doctrine that God created the world, indeed, created it, Aquinas supposed, out of nothing. But Aquinas was also very respectful of Aristotle's arguments for the eternity of the world. He had, then, somehow, to reconcile the appearance of beginninglessness, as captured in Aristotle's rather impressive reasoning, with the revealed doctrine of creation.

For myself -- that childhood self -- I came up with an analogy. Having posed my question to my mother and received no helpful response, I returned later to reassure her. "Don't worry, Mom," I said, "I think it's like a perfect circle someone has drawn. If you had been there when it was drawn, you would know where the circle begins. But as you look at it now, there's no way of telling. It's a perfect circle. The end connects up with the beginning without showing."

When now, 50 years later, I teach Aristotle or Aquinas to university students, I try to locate the questioning child in me and in my students. Unless I do so, the philosophy we do together will lose much of its urgency and much of its point.

My suggestion to you tonight is that philosophy is the systematic and disciplined attempt to deal with a range of questions that can and do occur to young children. In a closely related vein, the contemporary German philosopher, Robert Spaemann, has suggested that philosophy is "institutionalized naiveté." Spaemann supposes, that is, that philosophy is an institutionalized way to raise questions that could and do occur to young children, natural naiifs, on their own. Either way, it may be helpful to think of teaching philosophy as reconstructing childhood, that is, as asking ourselves and our students to make ourselves like children -- both so that we will feel afresh the magnetic pull of genuine philosophical inquiry and also so that we will not help ourselves to the hidden and unexamined assumptions that it is philosophy's job to question, assumptions that, in growing up, we have simply been socialized to accept.

If I am right, then spontaneous comments, questions and bits of reasoning can serve as a wonderful invitation to do philosophy. The book I have already referred to, Philosophy and the Young Child, contains, I think, many such comments, questions, and bits of reasoning.

When, for example, Ursula, to mention one of the characters in that book, reports to her mother that she has a pain in her tummy, her mother tells her to lie down and the pain will go away. Ursula, age three, asks -- whether mischievously, teasingly, or in a moment of deep perplexity, we don't know -- "Where will it go?" (That is, where will the pain go?)

Here are three very puzzling claims. (1) The pain is in Ursula's tummy. (2) It will go away. (3) Lying down will make it go away. Let's ignore the third. Gilbert Ryle spends several pages of The Concept of Mind trying to convince us that no pain is really located in anybody's body; he points out that if you open up the body you won't find the pain. Ryle would also have said that Ursula's pain doesn't really go away either. In my
lecture on languages -- natural, nonnatural and unnatu-
ral. Much of that lecture was taken up with the essen-
tially philosophical task of distinguishing senses of the
word 'natural' and then laying out, in terms of those dis-
tinctions, various comparisons and contrasts between
the naturalness of, say, Indo-European languages, Espe-
ranto, American Sign Language, computer BASIC, etc.

When I met this man later in the School of Epis-
temics I found myself telling him about my philosophy
class in St. Mary's Music School. He was intrigued.
"By the way," I said, "my kids have also been interested
in whether language is natural, and if so, in what way or
ways."

"What did they decide?" he asked.

I suggested we look at the transcript. Here is part
of what I showed him. I'm quoting now from the
published transcript that includes my own commen-
tary. The question had arisen, 'What are words, anyway?'
That question provoked from Daniel, age 9, a loud
guffaw. He then repeated, derisively, the question,
'What are words?'

Esther: "What's so funny about that, Daniel?"

Daniel: "Fancy someone saying, 'What's a
word?'"

Richard, who had joined the class in January,
when he was about to turn nine years old, added his
voice. "Come on then, Daniel," he said, "tell us: what's
a word?"

Several others then offered Daniel the same
challenge.

"If you're so smart, tell us, Daniel."

"Well," said Daniel, after a pause, "it's hard to
say."

Chorus: "See!"

Under continued pressure Daniel made an effort
to say what a word is. "It's an adjective, or something," he began.

"That's part of a word," said David-Paul. "That's
not what a word is." I assume he meant that an adjective
is one kind of word.

There was more conversational byplay and then,
trying to encourage Daniel as much as I could, I asked
him whether he thought he could explain to somebody,
in a way that would be helpful, what a word is.

I was tempted to say all this, but I resisted the
temptation. I contented myself with saying to Daniel,
"It's pretty hard, isn't it?"

Richard agreed. "Yeah, it's quite hard. You
can't describe a word."

Daniel was glad for a way out. "That's what I
mean," he said. "You can't describe a word."

Richard wanted to know whether the story was
finished. I said I didn't know, what did he think?

Richard: "Because we could have another bit
about what words are."

"We could," I agreed; "how would it go?"

Esther pointed out that it was already twenty
minutes past three, ten minutes until the end of the
period.

"Do you mean," I asked, "that we can't settle
what words are in ten minutes?"

"No, we can't," she said firmly.

I cajoled the kids a bit, and the discussion heated
up immediately.

Martin: "Words are just natural. You can't help
them."

David-Paul: "Words aren't natural."

Martin: "How could we have this conversation
now if we didn't have words?"

Me: "We couldn't."

David-Paul: "Words aren't natural. If your
mother didn't say anything to you, you would just go on
going, 'Waa, waa, waa, gaa, gaa, gaa...'

Martin: "It was natural for your mother to speak,
wasn't it?"

Martin's reply was perfect, given the point about
naturalness he was insisting on. But David-Paul was
undaunted. "That's because," he said, "her mother
taught her to speak and her mother taught her to speak.
And that goes back to when the first words came, like
'Umm, umm, wuh, wuh,...'."

Immediately the others began making primitive
sounds. Over the din I pressed a question aimed at
keeping the discussion going. "So how," I asked, "do
you think people got started using words?"

David-Paul: "They needed to have something to
show instead of just pointing."

The idea of how language might have got started
suddenly gripped Richard's imagination. "Yeah, how
did people make up words?" he mused. "People can't
just invent words. They couldn't say, 'We just made this
marvelous invention -- words.'"

I wanted to ask him why not. Was it because they
wouldn't have the idea of inventing words unless one
already had the idea of words, and then there would be
nothing to invent?

Though I very much wanted to explore Richard's
point, there was so much confusion at this point, so
many people talking at once, that I had all I could do to bring about some order again. The noise and confusion also made it impossible for me to transcribe anything from that part of the tape.

When the class finally settled down a bit, Richard was saying, "Words started in grunts and then... I don't know, then suddenly..." I think Richard was onto the idea that you couldn't conceive of what a word is if there weren't already words. So you couldn't invent them; they would just have to happen naturally.

Something like that was Martin's idea. "You're born with words," he said, adopting an almost moralistic tone, "and you're obviously expected to use them."

There followed an animated discussion on whether dogs or other animals use words. The connection with what had gone before seemed to be that if words were natural for human beings, one could expect them to be natural for other creatures as well.

Martin: "They have their own words."
David-Paul: "How do you know?"
Ise: "Well, why do dogs bark? Do they do it for the fun of it?"
David-Paul: "But they aren't saying things like the, a, ..."
Ise (and several others): "They are."
David-Paul: "All the barks are the same. They're not what you would call words, Ise."
Martin: "Dogs probably think that what we use are not words, in their sense of 'words'."

Speaking of the bark of a dog, David-Paul said, "It could mean a number of things, like 'I'm hungry,' 'I'm tired,' but they don't have different tones and things like that."

Esther: "I've got three dogs, and they go like this" -- she imitated a variety of dog sounds, rather convincingly -- "and they are words for them. But we can't find out what they are. We can't detect them."

David-Paul had the last comment: "What I'm trying to point out is that they do speak. But it's not words."

That ends the transcript cum commentary.

The visiting professor of linguistics was much impressed and very surprised to find so many of his own interests mirrored in the children's discussion. I think he shouldn't have been surprised. He wanted to know whether I asked the kids whether words are natural. "No," I said, "they raised that issue themselves." It was for me a validation of the fundamental character of his problem that it was something my kids gave expression to without any special prompting.

So what is the moral? Suppose I am right in suggesting that philosophy is the sustained and disciplined attempt to deal with a range of questions that naturally preoccupy children. How should this affect the way we teach philosophy?

As I have already suggested, one interesting thing to do with college students is to use a child's remark, like Ursula's question about where the pain in her tummy will go when she lies down, and to use that remark or question as a way of opening up a philosophical discussion. To do that is to make vivid the truth that philosophy is a natural human activity, like singing or playing a basic game, not something that has to be learned, like writing or playing an instrument.

More ambitiously, one could take an extended discussion, like the one I have just quoted on language, and use it to introduce philosophy, or some subject within philosophy. Part of the point of doing that might be to dramatize the fact that people with relatively little knowledge or sophistication can be very good at philosophy. What is required is a certain open-mindedness, some sensitivity to certain kinds of conceptual challenges, and a lack of embarrassment about asking what may seem to be childish questions.

Here is another idea. If I am right about philosophical thinking in young children, one can expect to find some echo of this proclivity in at least some children's literature. In fact, that expectation is fulfilled. So one can use a children's story to introduce a college class in philosophy to the topic of discussion for the day. To illustrate some of the philosophical richness to be found in children's literature, I shall now share with you a couple of my columns, "Thinking in Stories." These columns have appeared in the journal, Thinking, which is edited by Matthew Lipman and published by the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.

Not too long ago I wrote a column on William Steig's story, Yellow and Pink. Here is what I wrote: Two wooden figures, one painted pink, the other yellow, lie on newspapers in the sun, perhaps to dry. They look like marionettes. The pink one is short and fat, whereas the yellow one is straight and thin.

Each starts to wonder what he is doing there on the newspaper in the sun. When Yellow notices Pink beside him he asks, "Do I know you?"

"I don't think so," Pink replies cautiously.

"Do you happen to know what we're doing here?" Yellow asks. Pink doesn't know.

"Who are we?" asks Yellow. Pink doesn't know. "Someone must have made us," Pink surmises.

Yellow produces all sorts of difficulties with Pink's hypothesis and himself concludes, "We're an
accident, somehow or other we just happened."

Pink starts laughing. "You mean these arms I

I can move this way and that," he asks, "this head I can

turn in any direction, this breathing nose, these walking

feet, all of this just happened, by some kind of fluke?

That's preposterous!"

'Yellow is unmoved. He admonishes his com-

panion to stop and reflect. "With enough time," he says,

"a thousand, a million, maybe two and a half million

years, lots of unusual things could happen. Why not us?"

Patiently Pink takes up one feature of their con-

struction after another. In each case he challenges

Yellow to suggest how that feature could have been the

result of an accident. For each feature Pink mentions

Yellow tries to say how that feature could, indeed, have

been the result of an accident.

Finally a mustachioed man shambles up, exam-

ines Pink and Yellow, and announces, with satisfaction,

"Nice and dry." As the man takes Pink and Yellow

away, tucked under his arm, Yellow whispers in Pink's

ear, "Who is this guy?" Pink doesn't know.

In the Fifth Century B.C. Empedocles specu-

lated that animals and human beings could have been the

accidental concatenations of bits and matter, concatenations

that just happened to function well as units. The ideas of Empedocles, and, after him, those of Democri-

tes, Epicurus and Lucretius, are quite Darwinian, except

that the ancients had no genetic theory to explain how a

function well as a whole could reproduce itself, so that

the type would survive.

Plato, with his picture of the Master Craftsman

creating the world and all its inhabitants according to

eternal blueprints, was Pink to Empedocles’s Yellow.

Plato’s pupil, Aristotle, was at least Pinkish, and also a

clear opponent of Yellow.

The debate continues, right down to the present

day. David Hume and Charles Darwin refined the terms

of the debate, but they did not settle it.

In Steig’s story the mustachioed man at the end

vindicates Pink, even though, not recognizing his maker,

Pink doesn’t realize he has been vindicated. But is

Steig’s story also the story of our world? And how can

we find out?

Yellow and Pink is a gem. Not a question,

comment or descriptive detail in it is wasted. And the

illustrations, also by Steig, do much more than illustrate;

they embody the story they help tell.

Someone will ask who the story’s audience is

meant to be. (Someone always does.) No doubt that

question is almost as ricky and intriguing as the story’s

own question, ‘Who are we?’ Perhaps Mr. Steig will say

he wrote the story for himself. But I shall be dogmatic

and insist that his story is as much for the child philoso-

pher in every reflective adult as it is for the aspiring

scientist and incipient theologian in every curious child. 6

That column on Yellow and Pink addresses basic

questions in philosophical theology. Here is one I wrote

a long time ago that deals with the philosophy of mind.

Albert is a turtle, who complains that he has a

toothache. Albert’s father is quite unsympathetic. “That’s

impossible,” he says; “it is impossible for anyone in our

family to have a toothache.”

Though Albert’s father does point to his own

toothless mouth (does he also point to its toothlessness?)
to establish the impossibility of a turtle’s having a

toothache, he never actually says to Albert, “To have a

toothache you need to have a tooth and turtles don’t have

tooth.”

Wouldn’t it have been much better to tell Albert

that he can’t have a toothache because he doesn’t have

any teeth? Perhaps Albert can have a tailache; but he

doesn’t have the right equipment for having a toothache.

It isn’t even enough just to have a tooth (for

e xample, under one’s pillow). One can’t have an ache

in x unless x is a part of one’s very own body. Indeed for

y to be able to have an ache in x at a particular time, t, x

must be an integral part of y’s body at t.

But is that last claim really satisfactory? Descar-

tes was impressed by the fact that amputees sometimes

report having aches and pains in their amputated limbs

(the phenomenon of the “phantom limb”). Suppose that,

while I am unconscious, my last remaining tooth is ex-

tracted and, when I wake up, I report having an awful

toothache. Is it false that I then have a toothache, since

I then have no tooth? And what do I have instead? A

toothache? But suppose it doesn’t feel like a toothache?

(I’ve had those, too). But it’s not a headache. (Nor, of

course, is it a brainache!)

Albert’s grandmother is the only character in the

story who is sympathetic to Albert. To her he explains

that his “toothache” is on his left toe. Albert’s explana-

tion makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that he simple

doesn’t know what a toothache is.

How does one learn what a toothache is? By

having one? And how does one first know it is a

toothache one has?

Doesn’t it go this way? I come to learn that I have

various anatomical parts, including teeth. Once I know

a little about my own anatomy I immediately know

where I hurt without having to learn how to tell. Then,

so long as I know I have a tooth, I am in position to

recognize that an ache or pain I have is in my tooth.

But there are complications. Suppose the dentist

says there is nothing wrong with my tooth? Can the

dentist tell me I don’t have a toothache?

Perhaps what the dentist will say (it’s what a
dentist said to someone I know) is that, my tooth being sound, what I have is a simulated toothache. Is this something Albert could have had?

Then there is the ache in the phantom tooth. And if one can have an ache in a tooth one no longer has, why not in a tooth one never had?

Albert’s grandmother takes a handkerchief from her purse and wraps it around Albert’s toe. I don’t know whether that treatment would help a simulated toothache, or an ache in a phantom tooth, but it seems to have been just what Albert needed.

So my practical suggestion is that college teachers of philosophy might use a child’s question or comment, the transcription of a children’s discussion, or a children’s story to introduce a lecture or class discussion. My theoretical suggestion concerns the nature of the subject we teach.

The fact that most of the students who reach us in college have had no formal introduction to philosophy may suggest that philosophy presupposes intellectual maturity, or emotional maturity, or perhaps much more knowledge than most anyone has before reaching college. As you will realize by now, I think that that suggestion is quite wrong. It is not that intellectual maturity, or emotional maturity, or even nonphilosophical knowledge, is necessarily useless in philosophy. But they are not required. Sometimes they even get in the way.

What we teach in our college philosophy courses involves re-raising issues many of us have considered, at least implicitly, as children. Of course cultivating a certain naivete in college students is different from cultivating and encouraging the naturally naive reflections of young children. But, although different, it is not completely different. In fact it is possible to conceive the teaching of philosophy as a way of connecting us up with our own childhood by stripping away some of the anti-philosophical attitudes our society has socialized into us. I don’t claim that that is the only helpful way to conceive the teaching of philosophy. But it is one way. I myself think it is a pretty good way.

NOTES


Carnegie Mellon to Host Computer Conference

The Fourth International Conference on Computers and Philosophy will be held at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, August 10-12, 1989. The conference is sponsored by the American Association of Philosophy Teachers, the American Philosophical Association Committee on Computer Use in Philosophy, The Center for the Design of Educational Computing (CDEC) at Carnegie Mellon University, and the Carnegie Mellon Department of Philosophy.

Inquiries should be directed to the Program Coordinator:

Leslie Burkholder
CDEC
Carnegie Mellon University
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From the President

(Continued from Pg. 2)

blurs; the distinction between one’s public life and private life is not clear and distinct.

These reflections probably do not help answer the question of how hard we work or whether we work hard and long enough to earn our pay. Most college teachers I know love their work and their life style. Perhaps it is the luxury of spending one’s life doing what one most enjoys that gives the illusion to others that the work is not hard or serious. Perhaps there is no way to defend ourselves, but we should suspect that the professor bashers are those who suppose that work must be arduous or boring or distasteful in order to count as work, and that one should not be paid to do what one enjoys. These are surely attitudes that the profession must reject.
The lecture-format class comes to us from the Dark Ages, when the lecturer was literally a lector, "one who reads." Lecturing might have been the optimal teaching technique before the invention of the printing press, when reading to students was the only way to give them access to the contents of a book. But lecture-format classes are less compelling now, especially given the limitations of the method. The great enemies of the lecture are dispassion and passivity; students learn more readily and gain a deeper understanding when they are active collaborators in their own educations. Fortunate are the students of a teacher who asks herself, not "What am I going to talk about in class today?" but, "How do I want my students to be different at the end of class? And how should class be organized so as to effect that change?"

Thus, a new book edited by Arnold Wilson is particularly welcome. The book is Demonstrating Philosophy: Novel Ways to Teach Philosophical Concepts. It is a collection of articles, each offering an idea—a game, stratagem, simulation, puzzle, analogy, computer scheme, or course design—which provides an alternative way to make philosophy clear, alive, and important to students.

Ideally, an alternative teaching method should both capture students' interest and, at the same time, deepen their understanding of the subject matter. Because most of the articles were previously published over the past twenty years in the journal, Teaching Philosophy, I have already had a chance to use many of the alternative teaching methods in my classrooms. So I can testify from personal experience that several of the ideas succeed in achieving both goals.

"The Locke Game," designed by John Immerwahl and colleagues, is the best of these. It is a simple role-playing game, in which students act out the parts of farmers and hunter-gatherers, all struggling to accumulate enough food to get through another day. The rules are such that, at the end of the period, the classroom is populated by several dead hunter-gatherers, several wealthy land-owners, and many impoverished workers. I suggest that teachers add a roving thief, which causes the students to clamor for someone to protect their property. Thus, students act out Locke's ideas about the acquisition of private property and the justification for governments and, in the process, develop an understanding of the basis for Marx's critique of the capitalist system.

"Eleusis," a game invented by Robert Abbott, popularized by Martin Gardner, and described here by Spencer Schein, involves students in hot competition to determine the secret rule that governs the sequence in which cards may be played. It is, in fact, a card game in which only the dealer knows the rules, an apt analogy to the difficulties of scientific inquiry. By playing the game, students hone their skills of hypothetical reasoning and learn, to their dismay, about the dangers of confirming evidence.

Some of the most successful ideas are the simplest. For example, in "Philosophical Chairs," Zachary Seech describes a powerful format for class discussion in which students simply seat themselves in the classroom according to the position they hold on a controversial topic, a technique that assures the thoughtful involvement of every single student. In a different article, Arnold Wilson describes how he teaches students about the basic concept of an argument. As students enter the classroom, each is handed a 3x5 card containing a premise, a conclusion, or an indicator word and told to join with other students to make an argument. Soon the classroom is animated by discussion of what makes an argument hold together.

When these ideas work, they really work. Students are struck by a philosophical concept as if they were struck by a brick. However, when the ideas do not work, they bomb. Thus, abandoning the security of the lectern and venturing out into new ways of teaching makes a certain amount of courage. It also takes some savvy in the selection and design of alternative classroom experiences. Teachers should be particularly wary in regard to the following:

1. A good exercise cannot be silly or cute. Although children play games, games need not be childish. My students were put off when I tried out the exercise described as "The Rawls Game," in which they had to play the parts of citizens of "Nacirema, who suffer from sniffanyeed allergy."

2. Needless complexity kills an exercise. The goal is to use a simple exercise to illustrate a complex

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AAPT Book Review

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concept. When the procedure is more complicated than the concept, as seems to be the case in some of the exercises described, nothing is gained.

3. A good exercise reinforces, rather than undercuts, what is to be taught. If a technique is designed only to entertain, only to make studying philosophy fun, then it undermines a primary purpose—to teach students that philosophical ideas are interesting in themselves. Thus, I recommend caution in using such ideas as crossword puzzles (cf. “Crossword Puzzles for Introductory Courses in Philosophy” and “Logical Puzzles”).

4. A good exercise requires the active participation of students. For teachers who are stuck with a lecture format, as is probably the case for those with large classes, this book offers several suggestions for improving lectures, by relating the subject matter to something visual (“Raphael’s School of Athens in a Philosophy Classroom”) or to some part of popular culture (“Introducing Philosophy through Folk and Rock”), or by using audiovisual aids (“multi-media Meditations”). But a good lecture is still a lecture; none of these suggestions correct for the ultimate weakness of the method, namely that it sets students up as spectators, rather than as participants.

Science teachers long ago realized that students learn better when they are individually and actively involved in experimentation or observation; thus, the laboratory exercise. With some imagination, philosophy “lab exercises” can be just as fruitful. Philosophy, after all, is not just a body of knowledge; it is a way of thinking and a way of acting. So philosophy is particularly suited to active learning. Demonstrating Philosophy offers some excellent ideas. Its greatest value will be, however, that it will encourage philosophy teachers to think of other ways to bring their subject matter to life.

Kathleen Dean Moore
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Book Reviews Requested

With this issue, AAP News inaugurates a book review section. Review submissions in the following categories are requested:

(1) books directed at philosophy teachers (e.g., the review of Demonstrating Philosophy in this issue of AAP News), or

(2) books that you have used in your classroom either successfully or unsuccessfully (the focus here should be on the book as a teaching tool, and explicit reference should be made to students’ experiences with it), or

(3) books designed for classroom use (the focus here should be an assessment of the book’s likely success in the classroom).

In addition, we will print reader requests for comments on the classroom success of specific volumes.

Finally, any reader who is willing to review books is urged to submit his or her name to the editors. As we receive books from publishers, we will contact you regarding a review.

Submit Proposals for 1990

Anyone who is interested in doing a presentation at the AAPT session at the 1990 Central Division APA meetings in New Orleans should submit a proposal to Dale Schnetzer, Bowling Green State Univ./Firelands, Huron, OH 44839, by October 15, 1989. Proposals may be papers or some other clear indication of the intended program. Presenters should be committed to talking about their ideas (not to simply reading a paper) and to stimulating discussion.

AAPT Session Organizer Needed

Dale Schnetzer has been in charge of the AAPT session at the Central Division APA meetings for several years, and feels it is time to give someone else the opportunity to do that job, which involves arranging the program and chairing the session. If you are interested in working with Dale this year and taking over next year, please contact him at the Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University/Firelands, Huron, OH 44839.

Submit Your Newsletter Info

The editors of AAP News invite you to send in materials for publication. Share your ideas about teaching in Philosophy Teaching Exchange, a featured section of each issue. Write a report of a paper you have presented. Report on sessions you have attended at recent conferences. Send us your thoughts about what you have read in AAP News. We want to hear from you.

Submissions on diskette, when possible, are much appreciated. Any version of WordStar or WordPerfect is fine. WordPerfect users should include a Text Out (ASCII) file in addition to a document file. Users of other word processors should provide a straight ASCII file (MS-DOS/PC-DOS or CP/M 5 1/4" format).
Calendar of Events

June 21-23 - University of Maryland Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy Summer Workshop for Philosophers. Catholic University of America. Contact Kathleen Wiersema, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.


October 13 and 14 - Central States Philosophical Assoc., Univ. of Iowa. Papers due by July 1, 1989. Contact Panayot Butchvarov, Philosophy, Univ. of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242.


November 6-10 - History and Philosophy of Science in School Science Teaching Conference, Florida State Univ. Contact Kenneth Tobin, Science Education, Carrothers Hall, Florida State Univ., Tallahassee, FL 32306-3032.

December 27-30 - American Philosophical Assoc., Eastern Division (APA), Hyatt Regency, Atlanta, GA. Contact Eugene Long, Philosophy, Univ. of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208.

December 27-30 - American Assoc. of Philosophy Teachers, with APA. Contact Rosalind Ekman Ladd, Philosophy, Wheaton College, Norton, MA 02766.


August 6-10, 1990 - AAPT's 8th International Workshop/Conference on Teaching Philosophy will be held at Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Workshop proposals should be sent to: H. Phillips Hamlin, Program Chair, 8th IWCTP, Dept. of Philosophy, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-0480. Office: (615) 974-3255, Home: (615) 588-0000.

These listings are drawn in part from Nancy Simco (ed.), *The Philosophical Calendar*, published by The Conference of Philosophical Societies.

Invitation to Join AAPT

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